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Abstract
In this paper, we present a preliminary work on an ap-
proach to fill the gap between logic-based argumenta-
tion and the numerous approaches to tackle the dynam-
ics of abstract argumentation frameworks. Our idea is
that, even when arguments and attacks are defined by
means of a logical belief base, there may be some uncer-
tainty about how accurate is the content of an argument,
and so the presence (or absence) of attacks concerning
it. We use enthymemes to illustrate this notion of un-
certainty of arguments and attacks. Indeed, as argued in
the literature, real arguments are often enthymemes in-
stead of completely specified deductive arguments. This
means that some parts of the pair (support, claim) may
be missing because they are supposed to belong to some
“common knowledge”, and then should be deduced by
the agent which receives the enthymeme. But the per-
ception that agents have of the common knowledge may
be wrong, and then a first agent may state an enthymeme
that her opponent is not able to decode in an accurate
way. It is likely that the decoding of the enthymeme by
the agent leads to mistaken attacks between this new ar-
gument and the existing ones. In this case, the agent can
receive some information about attacks or arguments
acceptance statuses which disagree with her argumenta-
tion framework. We exemplify a way to incorporate this
new piece of information by means of existing works on
the dynamics of abstract argumentation frameworks.
Introduction
Argumentation frameworks (AFs) are a convenient way to
represent conflicting information and to deduce which sub-
set of the information can be inferred. For instance, they can
be used to model dialogs between several agents (Amgoud
and Hameurlain 2006) or to analyze on-line discussion be-
tween social network users (Leite and Martins 2011). Ar-
gumentation can also be useful in a mono-agent setting, for
instance to infer non-trivial conclusions from an inconsistent
knowledge base (Besnard and Hunter 2001).
The domain called dynamics of argumentation has
become a hot topic in recent years, with numerous
publications about it. The first ones consider really
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classical debate scenarios as the source of the dy-
namic process (Boella, Kaci, and van der Torre 2009a;
Boella, Kaci, and van der Torre 2009b; Cayrol, de Saint-Cyr,
and Lagasquie-Schiex 2010; Baumann and Brewka 2010;
Bisquert et al. 2011; Bisquert et al. 2013; Baumann 2012;
Booth et al. 2013). These approaches are perfectly well-
suited for classical exchange of arguments between agents.
Then, some approaches have proposed to consider new
scenarios, closer to what happens with belief change in log-
ical settings (Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson 1985;
Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991; Katsuno and Mendelzon
1992): these approaches propose to question the existing
relation between arguments, and to modify this relation
if it is required (Doutre, Herzig, and Perrussel 2014;
Nouioua and Wu¨rbel 2014; Coste-Marquis et al. 2014a;
Coste-Marquis et al. 2014b; Coste-Marquis et al. 2015;
Baumann and Brewka 2015; Diller et al. 2015).
These works directly deal with the structure of the
abstract AFs. An interesting question is “What does AF
revision mean when we consider logic-based AFs?”.
Indeed, it is not obvious that attacks between arguments
can be changed, since they stem from the logical inference
relation; for instance, if arguments a and b attack each
other because their claims are the negation of each other
(rebuttal attack), then it is not accurate to consider that the
attack between a and b could be removed. But this is only
the case when we consider completely specified deductive
arguments (Besnard and Hunter 2001). As argued in the
literature (Hunter 2007), the arguments which are used in
real situations are often enthymemes, which are partially
specified arguments: some parts of the support or some
parts of the claim are not described, because it is supposed
that they belong to some “common knowledge”. There may
be different reasons for an agent not to share some part of
her knowledge, such as some cost on the communication
process. Then, the agent who receives an enthymeme must
decide how to complete the content of the enthymeme to
be able to use it. But if the missing formulae to complete
the enthymeme are not part of the agent’s beliefs (or at
least, are not considered by the agent as the most accurate
way to complete the enthymeme), then she will use a badly
completed enthymeme in her argumentation framework.
We see with this situation that, even with an underlying
ar
X
iv
:1
60
3.
08
78
9v
1 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 29
 M
ar 
20
16
logical belief base, the nature of arguments and attacks is
not absolute; it depends on the agent’s beliefs and on her
way to complete enthymemes.
So we propose to consider the use of enthymemes in
the argumentation process to explain the questionability of
some attacks. We illustrate the possibility that a logic-based
argumentation framework contains mistaken attacks. Then
we show that the existing work on the dynamics of AFs
can be used on such enthymeme-based AFs, as soon as
a distinction between classical deductive arguments and
enthymemes is done in the abstract AF, and that this
distinction is used in the revision process.
The paper is organized as follows. The first section
presents the background notions required to the understand-
ing of the paper. In particular, we describe briefly belief revi-
sion, abstract argumentation and revision of AFs, and logic-
based argumentation. Then in the second section, we focus
on enthymemes in logic-based AFs; we explain how using
enthymemes can be a source of mistaken attacks in the re-
sulting AF. The following section illustrates the revision pro-
cess on logic-based AFs which contain enthymemes. After
the description of a basic approach in which each attack con-
cerning an enthymeme is questionable, we propose a refine-
ment of this approach based on the notion of fixed part of
an enthymeme. Finally, the last section concludes the paper
and sketches some interesting future work.
Background
Belief Revision
Belief revision is well-known when an agent’s beliefs are
represented in a logical setting. The intuitive idea is “How
can an agent incorporate a new piece of information into her
beliefs?”, which is not a trivial question when the agent’s
previous beliefs and the new piece of information are con-
flicting. One of the most influencial works on this topic is the
AGM framework (Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson
1985), which gives rationality postulates for belief change
operators, when the beliefs are represented as deductively
closed sets of formulae. Here we are interested in the adap-
tation of AGM revision to finite propositional logic by Kat-
suno and Mendelzon (1991). They explain that revising a
formula ϕ by a formula α is equivalent to selecting some
models of α which are minimal w.r.t. some plausibility rela-
tion. This relation has to satisfy some properties.
Definition 1 (Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991). A faithful as-
signment is a mapping from a formula ϕ to a total pre-order
between interpretations ≤ϕ such that:
1. if I |= ϕ and I ′ |= ϕ, then I 'ϕ I ′;
2. if I |= ϕ and I ′ 6|= ϕ, then I <ϕ I ′;
3. if ϕ ≡ ϕ′, then ≤ϕ=≤ϕ′ .
Then, a KM revision operator ◦ is a mapping from two for-
mulae ϕ, α to a new formula such that
mod (ϕ ◦ α) = min( mod (α),≤ϕ)
For instance, the Dalal revision operator can be defined
through the pre-order built on the Hamming distance.
Definition 2 (Hamming 1950; Dalal 1988). The Hamming
distance between two propositional interpretations I, I ′ is
the number of assignments which differ between I and I ′,
formally: dH(I, I ′) = |(I\I ′) ∪ (I ′\I)|.
The total pre-order ≤dHϕ is defined by
I ≤dHϕ I ′ iff min
J∈ mod (ϕ)
(dH(I, J)) ≤ min
J∈ mod (ϕ)
(dH(I
′, J))
The Dalal revision operator ◦D is a mapping from two for-
mulae ϕ, α to a new formula such that
mod (ϕ ◦D α) = min( mod (α),≤dHϕ )
Let us illustrate the behavior of the Dalal revision opera-
tor.
Example 1. Consider V = {a, b, c, d} and ϕ = [(a ∧
b) ∨ (¬a ∧ c) ∨ ¬(b ∨ (a ∧ c))] ∧ ¬d. The models of
ϕ are {{a}, {c}, {a, b}, {b, c}, {a, b, c}}. We revise ϕ by
α = a ∧ ¬b ∧ c. The models of α are {{a, c}, {a, c, d}}.
Table 1 gives the Hamming distance between models of ϕ
and models of α.
{a, c} {a, c, d}
∅ 2 3
{a} 1 2
{c} 1 2
{a, b} 2 3
{b, c} 2 3
{a, b, c} 1 2
Table 1: Hamming distance between models of ϕ and α
Since the minimal Hamming distance between {a, c} and
a model of ϕ is 1 (dH({a, c}, {a}) for instance), while the
distance between {a, c, d} and any model of ϕ is at least
2, then {a, c} <dHϕ {a, c, d}, and so mod (ϕ ◦Da α) =
{{a, c}}.
Abstract Argumentation and AF Revision
An abstract AF is a directed graph which represents the ar-
guments and the attacks between them. The usual problem to
solve with such an abstract AF is “How to determine which
arguments are accepted?”. This question is tackled in the
seminal paper by Dung (1995).
Definition 3 (Dung 1995). An argumentation framework
(AF) is a pair F = 〈A,R〉 where A is a set of abstract
entities called arguments, and R ⊆ A × A is the attack
relation which represents the conflicts between arguments.
Given a semantics σ, the σ-extensions of F , denoted σ(F ),
are subsets of A which can be accepted. An argument is
then skeptically accepted by F w.r.t. σ iff it belongs to each
σ-extension of F .
In this paper, we illustrate our approach on the stable se-
mantics: S ⊆ A is a stable extension of F (denoted by
S ∈ st(F )) iff
• 6 ∃x, y ∈ S s.t. (x, y) ∈ R;
• ∀y ∈ A\S, ∃x ∈ S s.t. (x, y) ∈ R.
Example 2. Given the set of arguments A = {x, y, z,
t, u}, the AF F1 = 〈A,R〉 with R = {(x, y), (x, t),
(y, x), (y, z), (z, u), (t, u)} is given in Figure 1.
u
z
tx
y
Figure 1: The AF F1
Its stable extensions are st(F1) = {{x, z}, {y, t}}.
As explained in the introduction, the question of change
in AFs has been tackled by several approaches. Here we
use the translation-based revision from (Coste-Marquis et
al. 2014b). The idea of this method is to translate the AF
and the semantics into a propositional formula, to use a KM
revision operator to perform the expected change, and then
to decode the models of the revised formula to obtain a set
of revised AFs. The propositional encoding is a general-
ization of a result from Besnard and Doutre (2004). They
have defined a formula Ξ, built on propositional variables
corresponding to the arguments, such that the set of mod-
els of Ξ exactly correspond to the set of stable extensions
of an AF. Coste-Marquis et al. (2014b) generalize this en-
coding with the addition of two other kinds of variables
V = {attx,y | x, y ∈ A} ∪ {accx | x ∈ A}. attx,y means
that there is an attack from the argument x to the argument y,
and accx means that the argument x is skeptically accepted.
Definition 4 (Coste-Marquis et al. 2014b). Given an AF
F = 〈A = {x1, . . . , xn}, R〉, the stable encoding of F is
fst(F ) = (
∧
(x,y)∈R
attx,y) ∧ (
∧
(x,y)/∈R
¬attx,y) ∧ thst(A)
where
thst(A) =
∧
x∈A[accx ⇔ ∀x1, . . . ,∀xn,
(
∧
y∈A(y ⇔
∧
z∈A(attz,y ⇒ ¬z))⇒ x)]
In general, fσ(F ) can be defined for any semantics σ as
soon as the formula Ξ exists; for semantics with a complex-
ity higher than NP, we can consider for instance QBF en-
codings to define Ξ.
Then, the revision operator is defined as follow:
Definition 5 (Coste-Marquis et al. 2014b). Given ◦ a KM
revision operator and ϕ a propositional formula built from
the set of variables V , the translation-based revision opera-
tor ?◦ is defined as
F ?◦ ϕ = dec(fσ(F ) ◦ (ϕ ∧ thσ(A)))
with dec a mapping from a formula ψ to a set of AFs F such
that each AF F ′ ∈ F corresponds to one of the models ω of
ψ: (x, y) appears in F ′ iff attx,y is true in ω.
This general definition allows to change any attack and ar-
gument status as long as it is compatible with σ. If additional
constraints should be satisfied,1 the use of a constrained ver-
sion is possible:
Definition 6 (Coste-Marquis et al. 2014b). Given ◦ a KM
revision operator and ϕ, µ two propositional formulae built
from the set of variables V , the constrained translation-
based revision operator ?µ◦ is defined as
F ?µ◦ ϕ = dec(fσ(F ) ◦ (ϕ ∧ thσ(A) ∧ µ))
To conclude, let us mention a particular revision operator
proposed by (Coste-Marquis et al. 2014b): we call ?att (resp.
?µatt) the translation-based (resp. constrained translation-
based) revision operator which gives priority to the mini-
mal change of the attack relation. This operator is similar to
the Dalal-based revision revision operator ?◦D , but it uses a
weighted version of the Hamming distance such that chang-
ing the value of a single attx,y variable is more expensive
than changing the value of each accx variable.
Example 3. We consider the AF F1 given in Figure 1.
We suppose the existence of an integrity constraint attt,u ∧
attz,u, which means that the attacks from t and z to u must
not be removed. The result of the revision F1 ?
µ
◦D accu is
the AF F2 described in Figure 2. Now the extensions are
u
z
tx
y
Figure 2: F2 = F ?
µ
◦D accu
st(F2) = {{x, u}, {y, u}}, so u is skeptically accepted.
We focus on this kind of revision operators because
(Coste-Marquis et al. 2014b) already proposes a way to in-
corporate a constraint on the attack relation, which is re-
quired by our approach. Other revision or update operators
could be used instead, but we should adapt their definition
to take into account the constraint.
Logic-based Arguments: Deductive Arguments
The question of the exact nature of arguments and attacks is
tackled by several approaches which can be gathered under
the name structural argumentation. Here we focus on one of
the most prominent ones: deductive argumentation (Besnard
and Hunter 2001).
Definition 7 (Besnard and Hunter 2001). A deductive argu-
ment built from a belief base ∆ is a pair 〈Φ, α〉, where Φ is
called the support and α the claim, such that:
1. Φ ⊆ ∆,
2. Φ 6` ⊥,
3. Φ ` α,
1Such as external constraint depending on the particular appli-
cation, or some rules of the world.
4. Φ is minimal with respect to⊆ among the sets of formulae
which satisfy items 1. 2. and 3.
There is an intuitive explanation to this definition. First
the agent is supposed to use her beliefs to justify her claim,
which explains the first condition. The second and third
conditions guarantee that the claim is actually supported by
the beliefs of the agent, but not by conflicting beliefs (for
instance, the sentence “It is raining and it is not raining,
so I am the Queen of England.” is not an argument at all).
Finally, the last condition ensures that there is no useless
piece of information in the support: “It is raining, when it is
raining I should use an umbrella, and I love chocolate. So I
will use my umbrella.” is not accurate either.
The conflicts between deductive arguments may have dif-
ferent natures. The most general sort of conflict is defined as
follow:
Definition 8 (Besnard and Hunter 2001). A defeater for
an argument 〈Φ, α〉 is an argument 〈Φ′, α′〉 such that α′ `
¬(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn), for some {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} ⊆ Φ.
It is possible to use deductive arguments to build an argu-
ment tree with the arguments and counterarguments which
attack and defend a given claim.
We can also build a full argumentation framework from the
set of deductive arguments generated from a belief base.
Definition 9 (Besnard and Hunter 2014). Given A the
set of deductive arguments generated from the belief base
∆, the exhaustive graph associated with ∆ is the AF
F = 〈A,R〉 with R = {(x, y) ∈ A×A | x is a defeater for
y}.
Here we focus on the defeater relation, which is the most
general one, but exhaustive graphs can be generated with
another attack relation which guarantees additional proper-
ties for the defeaters (undercut, rebuttal, and so on). More-
over, these graphs may be infinite in general; Besnard and
Hunter propose an approach to circumvent this problem. See
(Besnard and Hunter 2014) for more details.
Enthymemes and their Role in Mistaken
Attacks
Intuitive Explanation
Before formalizing our approach, we want to explain intu-
itively, with natural language arguments, why agents can
disagree on the attack relation, and more generally why at-
tacks could be questionable. Let us consider the following
arguments:
(c) The US army is preparing a secret plan to retreat from
Afghanistan (source: Wikileaks).
(b) Our informed sources say that the Wikileaks documents
are fake (source: NY Times).
(a) The media cannot be trusted on military issues (source:
N. Chomsky).
Now we consider three agents A1, A2, A3; each of them
may have some personal beliefs which are not shared with
the other agents.
• A1 thinks that Chomsky is the most credible source, and
considers that Wikileaks is a media more reliable than NY
Times. So her AF is the one given in Fig. 3a.
• A2 thinks that Chomsky is a more credible source than
NY Times, and NY Times is a more credible source than
Wikileaks. She also believes that Wikileaks cannot be
seen as a media. So her AF is the one given in Fig. 3b.
• Finally, A3 thinks that NY Times is the most credible
source, and that Chomsky is not reliable on this topic. So
her AF is the one given in Fig. 3c.
These personal AFs may depend on many different parame-
ters (additional information which is not available to each
agent, preferences, context, previous experience of each
agent, and so on).
a b c
(a) Agent A1
a b c
(b) Agent A2
a b c
(c) Agent A3
Figure 3: Three Agents Disagreement
Of course, under the assumption that the agents share
all their knowledge and beliefs, the personal beliefs of the
agents can be represented as additional arguments and we
obtain a single AF representing the whole information about
a topic. But we think that this assumption is too strong for
at least three reasons. First, there may be technical issues
with this information sharing; for instance, there may be
some cost on communication between agents, or the global
amount of information in the network may be too important
to be stored in a centralized way. Then, for strategical rea-
sons, agents may choose not to share their knowledge and
beliefs. Also, if argument are mined from natural language
(for instance, for an analysis of social networks debates),
there are likely some implicit pieces of information used in
the argumentation process. This explains why some attacks
may be questionable.
For instance, if the agents A1 and A3 consider that agent
A2 is trustworthy, then they could have to change the at-
tack relation in their own AFs if they receive from agent A2
the information “c should be accepted”. On the opposite, if
agents vote to determine the arguments statuses, there will
be a majority of agents (A1 and A3) voting against c (mean-
ing that c is rejected in their AFs), so agent A2 should mod-
ify the attack relation to incorporate this piece of information
in her AF.
Enthymemes with partial support Now let us formalize
this notion of “arguments with partial knowledge”, and their
role in the existence of mistaken attacks. Hunter (2007) de-
fines what he calls approximate arguments, which are pairs
〈Φ, α〉 which do not satisfy the four conditions of deductive
arguments. He classifies them depending on which proper-
ties they satisfy, and then focuses on enthymemes. An en-
thymeme is a pair 〈Φ, α〉 such that Φ 6` α, but there is a set
Ψ ⊆ ∆ such that 〈Φ ∪ Ψ, α〉 is a deductive argument. In-
tuitively, Ψ represents some “common knowledge” that the
agent supposes to be known by her opponents. Then it is not
useful for the agent to state the full deductive argument to be
able to exchange information and to reach her goal (persuad-
ing her opponent, helping to take a decision, negotiating, and
so on).
Example 4. To illustrate this concept, we borrow a sim-
ple example of real life use of enthymemes from (Hunter
2007). Let us consider John and his wife Yoko, who is
going outside without an umbrella. If John tells her “You
should take your umbrella, because the weather report pre-
dicts rain”, there is no formal reason to consider that 〈Φ, α〉
(with Φ = {rain predicted} and α = take umbrella) is
an argument. It is in fact an enthymeme, because John sup-
poses that Ψ = {rain predicted ⇒ take umbrella} is
part of the knowledge he shares with Yoko.
One of the questions tackled in (Hunter 2007) is “How
does the agent knows that Ψ is actually part of the common
knowledge?”. Hunter supposes that each agent has a way to
evaluate the plausibility that a given formula will be part of
the knowledge shared between her and another agent.
Definition 10 (Hunter 2007). For each agent Ai whose be-
liefs are expressed in the propositional language L,
• ∆i ⊆ L denotes her own personal base,
• and for each other agent Aj , µi,j is a mapping from the
language L to [0, 1], such that µi,j(α) represents the cer-
tainty that α is common to both agents Ai and Aj .
On enthymemes and mistaken attacks This mapping
µi,j is used by the agent to build her arguments and decide
whether they should be fully specified deductive arguments,
or whether enthymemes can be used. The idea is simply to
keep only the formulae ϕ in the support such that the associ-
ated value µi,j(ϕ) is less than a given threshold τ ; the other
ones can be omited because they are supposed to be known
by agent Aj .
This process may lead to some problems in the exchange
of arguments. There are at least two sources of mistakes.
1. The mapping µi,j describes the perception that agent Ai
has of her common knowledge with Aj . If this percep-
tion is wrong, then there could be some exchange of en-
thymemes that the agent Aj cannot decode accurately.
2. Even with a good evaluation of the common knowledge
by µi,j , the choice of a bad threshold could also lead to
enthymemes that the other agent cannot decode.
In both these situations, agent Aj receives some “argument”
a = 〈Φ, α〉 which is not fully specified, and then she has
to complete the support with some Ψ′ from her own belief
base, which could of course lead to the addition of some
attacks from an existing argument b to this new argument
a, for instance if the claim of b is the formula ¬ψ, for
some ψ ∈ Ψ′. Even if for low-level treatments, it can be
represented as a′ = 〈Φ ∪ Ψ′, α〉 (for instance to determine
if possibly new incoming arguments attack it), at a higher
level it is still the argument a which is used. Indeed, this
a′ is not an argument that Aj has built by herself, since
some of the premises are not part of her belief base.2 Then,
agent Aj can receive a new piece of information about the
argument a which is incompatible with the attack from b to
a (the simplest example being “a and b should be accepted
together”). So she has to build a new internal state a′′
from a subset Ψ′′ from her belief base; for the same reason
as previously, at a higher level it is still the argument a
originally built from agent Ai’s beliefs.
Enthymemes with partial claim We have seen that en-
thymemes are a way to communicate arguments with partial
support. Black and Hunter (2012) also give some examples
of enthymemes with a partial claim. Borrowing their exam-
ple, let us consider the sentence α = “John has bought The
Times”. The enthymeme 〈{α},>〉 can be interpreted in at
least two ways, which lead to different claims:
1. 〈{α, α ⇒ β}, β〉 with β = “John has bought a copy of
the newspaper The Times”;
2. 〈{α, α⇒ γ}, γ〉 with γ = “John has bought the company
which publishes the newspaper The Times”.
Similarly to what we have described for enthymemes with
a partial support, if an agent receives an argument a which
is in fact an enthymeme with a partial claim, some mistakes
in the attack relation can appear. For instance, she may
consider that a attacks an argument b because some part of
b’s support is conflicting with the completed claim (either
β or γ in our example). If she later receives a piece of
information which is not compatible with this attack, then
she may have to consider a removal of this attack (for
instance, because the chosen claim is not accurate).
So we can formally define the class of enthymemes (with
partial claims and partial supports) as follows:
Definition 11 (Black and Hunter 2012). Given d = 〈Φ, α〉
a deductive argument, an approximate argument 〈Φ′, α′〉 is
an enthymeme for d iff Φ′ ⊂ Φ and α ` α′.
Stated otherwise, the pair 〈Φ, α〉 is an enthymeme for
〈Φ ∪ Ψ, α ∧ β〉, with Φ the partial support and α the par-
tial claim. In the rest of this paper, we call such a pair 〈Φ, α〉
a non-completed enthymeme and 〈Φ∪Ψ, α∧β〉 a completed
enthymeme. A completed enthymeme may not satisfy the
conditions stated in Definition 7, since the set of formulae Φ
comes from another agent’s belief base. Moreover, contrary
to a fully specified argument stemming from the agent’s be-
liefs, a completed enthymeme can be questioned.
2To do this, it is a logical belief revision/expansion/update
which should be performed, and this would likely have some side
effects on the whole belief base, not only on the formulae involed
in argument a.
Dynamics of AFs and Enthymemes
Building a Dung’s AF from Enthymemes
For several reasons, the use of an abstract AF by the agent is
interesting, even when she uses an underlying belief base.
For instance, the developement of efficient approaches to
solve abstract argumentation problems permits to obtain the
conclusion of the agent’s AF with respect to several seman-
tics and inference policies (see for instance the competition
of argumentation solvers (Thimm and Villata 2015)). But to
avoid the loss of information about the nature of arguments
and attacks, we propose to refine the definition of the AF.
Definition 12. Given D and E which denote respec-
tively the agent’s deductive arguments and enthymemes, the
agent’s enthymeme-based AF is F (D,E) = 〈A,R〉 with
• A = D ∪ E;
• R = RD ∪RE ;
• RD ⊆ D×D the set of certain attacks (between deductive
arguments);
• RE ⊆ (A × A)\(D ×D) the set of questionable attacks
(concerning at least one enthymeme).
Computing the extensions of such an AF is identical to the
process for classical Dung’s AFs; differentiating both kinds
of attacks is useful only for the dynamics scenarios such as
revision.
In this setting, each attack can be added or removed as
soon as it concerns at least one enthymeme. We will refine
this later.
Example 5. Let F3 be the enthymeme-based AF presented
in Fig. 4. Arguments with rounded corners are the en-
thymemes while the other ones are deductive arguments.
Similarly, the dashed arrows represent the questionable at-
tacks, while the other ones are the certain attacks. In this
example, we suppose that the agent has received the en-
thymemes in the following way:
• e1 = 〈{α}, γ〉, which has been completed by Ψ1 = {α⇒
β, β ⇒ γ};
• e2 = 〈{η},>〉, which has been completed by Ψ2 = {η ⇒
¬} in the support and ¬ in the claim.
e1 = 〈{α, α⇒ β, β ⇒ γ}, γ〉
d1 = 〈{δ, δ ⇒ (β ∧ ¬γ)}, β ∧ ¬γ〉
d2 = 〈{, ⇒ ¬δ},¬δ〉
e2 = 〈{η, η ⇒ ¬},¬〉
Figure 4: The Enthymeme-based AF F3
With this AF, the accepted arguments are {e2, d1}.
Applying Dynamics of Abstract AFs to
Enthymeme-based AFs
The existence of mistaken attacks in an enthymeme-based
AF can be tackled through some approaches of the dynam-
ics of abstract argumentation (Bisquert et al. 2013; Doutre,
Herzig, and Perrussel 2014; Coste-Marquis et al. 2014a;
Coste-Marquis et al. 2014b; Coste-Marquis et al. 2015). In
the case when some arguments and the relations between
them are certain (in particular, when they are fully specified
arguments instead of enthymemes), integrity constraints can
simply be added to these revision/update/enforcement oper-
ators to ensure that forbidden attacks will not be added, and
mandatory attacks will not be removed. Since it is already
defined by (Coste-Marquis et al. 2014b), we will exemplify
the dynamics of argumentation with their constrained revi-
sion approach, presented previously. We can encode an in-
tegrity constraint to fix the attacks and non-attacks concern-
ing the deductive arguments into the setting from (Coste-
Marquis et al. 2014b).
Definition 13. Given F (D,E) an enthymeme-based AF,
the integrity constraint on deductive arguments is
µD = (
∧
(x,y)∈RD
attx,y) ∧ (
∧
(x,y)∈(D×D)\RD
¬attx,y)
Now, if the agent receives some piece of information
about the arguments statuses or the attack relation, then she
can use the AF revision operator ?µDatt as defined previously
in the case when this new piece of information disagrees
with the current AF. This revision operator guarantees that
the relations between deductive arguments will not be mod-
ified during the revision process, which is desirable since
they are directly stemming from the logical inference rela-
tion.
Example 5 Continued. We continue the previous example.
The agent receives the piece of information “e1 should be
accepted”, which corresponds to the formula acce1 . The in-
tegrity constraint is attd2,d1 ∧ ¬attd1,d2 , which ensures that
the attacks between the deductive arguments d1 and d2 will
not be modified. The possible results are given in Fig. 5.
e1 d1 d2 e2
(a) F4
e1 d1 d2 e2
(b) F5
Figure 5: Possible Results of the Revision
The exact change operator which should be used de-
pends on the the properties expected for the process, for in-
stance it is well-known that performing an update (Bisquert
et al. 2013; Doutre, Herzig, and Perrussel 2014) is accurate
when the change is explained by an evolution of the world,
while performing a revision (Coste-Marquis et al. 2014a;
Coste-Marquis et al. 2014b) is accurate when the evolu-
tion only concerns the agent’s beliefs about the world; thus
these operations do not satisfy the same properties. Simi-
larly, among the different approaches in the state of the art
about the dynamics of AFs, each of them do not have the
same expressivity. For instance, the revision approach de-
scribed in (Coste-Marquis et al. 2014a) permits to revise by
a formula concerning the extensions, while the translation-
based approach illustrated here permits to revise by a for-
mula concerning skeptical acceptance of arguments and at-
tacks at the same time. So, the choice of a change opera-
tor completely depends on the application and the agent’s
needs and preferences. In the following, we continue to con-
sider revision to be consistent with the previous example, but
update and extension enforcement (Baumann and Brewka
2010) could be considered as well.
From Revised AFs to new Completed Enthymemes
After obtaining the result of the revision process, the agent
should now decode this result to determine which of the re-
vised AFs is the most plausible real AF corresponding to her
beliefs, and which enthymemes should be internally modi-
fied (and how they should be internally modified) to ensure
that the abstract AF and the logic-based AF coincide.
Definition 14. Let F be the set of AFs obtained from the
revision process. For each F ′ ∈ F , F ′ is called an accept-
able AF iff for each attack which differs between the original
AF F and F ′, the agent’s belief base contains some formu-
lae which allow to complete the enthymemes s.t. this new
completion is consistent with the attacks in F ′.
Example 5 Continued. Continuing the previous example,
let us suppose that the agent’s belief base contains the for-
mulae Ψ′ = {α ⇒ θ, θ ⇒ γ}. Then the enthymeme e1
can be completed into 〈{α, α⇒ θ, θ ⇒ γ}, γ〉, which leads
to the acceptable AF F4 given in Fig. 6a. Similarly, if the
agent’s belief base contains the formulae Ψ′′ = {η ⇒ ι},
then the agent can consider the acceptable AF F5 given in
Fig. 6b, since e2 can be completed into 〈{η, η ⇒ ι}, ι〉.
When the set of acceptable AFs is not a singleton, we can
consider two different solutions:
• the agent can keep the whole set as the result, to express
the uncertainy of the result of the revision, as suggested by
(Bisquert et al. 2013; Coste-Marquis et al. 2014a; Coste-
Marquis et al. 2014b; Doutre, Herzig, and Perrussel 2014)
which consider that revising or updating an AF can lead
to a set of AFs;
• the agent can use external information (preferences be-
tween AFs, preferences between formulae in the en-
thymemes, and so on) to select a single acceptable AF
as the result.
None of them is in general more desirable than the other
one, the choice depends on the situation (specific applica-
tion, user’s preferences, computational issues,. . . ).
Refining Questionable Attacks
In the previous parts, we suppose that each attack con-
cerning an enthymeme is questionable. But we can be
more precise in the definition of the enthymeme-based AF.
Indeed, even when we consider an enthymeme e, some of
e1 = 〈{α, α⇒ θ, θ ⇒ γ}, γ〉
d1 = 〈{δ, δ ⇒ (β ∧ ¬γ)}, β ∧ ¬γ〉
d2 = 〈{, ⇒ ¬δ},¬δ〉
e2 = 〈{η, η ⇒ ¬},¬〉
(a) Instantiation of F4 by a New
Completion of e1
e1 = 〈{α, α⇒ β, β ⇒ γ}, γ〉
d1 = 〈{δ, δ ⇒ (β ∧ ¬γ)}, β ∧ ¬γ〉
d2 = 〈{, ⇒ ¬δ},¬δ〉
e2 = 〈{η, η ⇒ ι}, ι〉
(b) Instantiation of F5 by a New
Completion of e2
Figure 6: Different Acceptable AFs
the attacks concerning it may be certain. We know that
some parts of e, that we have called previously the partial
support and the partial claim, are fixed. If the reason of
an attack between e and a deductive argument is a logical
conflict involving one of these fixed parts of e, then this
attack can be considered as certain. Similarly, when we
consider another enthymeme e′, if there is an attack between
e and e′ which is stemming from the fixed part of e and
the fixed part of e′, then this attack cannot be removed either.
Let us first formalize this notion of fixed part.
Definition 15. If a = 〈Φ, α〉 is a deductive argument or
a non-completed enthymeme, then the fixed part of a is
fix(a) = Φ ∪ {α}.
If a = 〈Φ ∪ Ψ, α ∧ β〉 is a completed enthymeme, then
fix(a) = Φ ∪ {α}.
So if we consider a fully specified deductive argument or
a non-completed enthymeme, the fixed part is the set of all
the formulae involved in it. But when we consider an en-
thymeme completed with the agent’s beliefs, then the fixed
part is the set of formulae which appear in the enthymeme
that the agent has originally received, but do not appear in
the completed version of it.
Example 5 Continued. Let us consider again the arguments
d1, d2, e1 and e2. The fixed parts of the deductive arguments
are trivially the union of their support and their claim.
The result is more interesting for the enthymemes:
• fix(e1) = {α, γ};
• fix(e2) = {η,>};
Now let us define the involved part of an argument in an
attack.
Definition 16. Let a = 〈Φ, α〉 and b = 〈Φ′, α′〉 be two
arguments (deductive arguments, completed enthymemes or
non-completed enthymemes). If there is an attack between a
and b, then the involved part of a in the conflict between a
and b, denoted by invb(a), is the set Ψ ⊆ Φ∪ {α} such that
(
∧
ψ∈Ψ ψ) ∧ (
∧
ϕ′∈Φ′∪{α′} ϕ
′) ` ⊥ and Ψ is minimal w.r.t.
⊆. Otherwise, invb(a) = inva(b) = ∅.
So, if we have a rebuttal conflict between a and b (mean-
ing that the claims are the contradiction of each other) then
invb(a) = {α} and inva(b) = {α′}. If the conflict is
an undercut from a to b (meaning that the claim α of a
is conflicting with some part ϕ′ of the support of b), then
invb(a) = {α} and inva(b) = {ϕ′}.
Example 5 Continued. Now we can see which parts of the
arguments d1, d2, e1 and e2 are involved in conflicts. The
certain attack (d2, d1) comes from the contradiction between
δ and ¬δ, so invd1(d2) = {¬δ} and invd2(d1) = {δ}. Con-
cerning the questionable attacks, we have:
• inve1(d1) = {β ∧ ¬γ} and invd1(e1) = {β ⇒ γ};
• inve2(d2) = {} and invd2(e2) = {¬}.
Now we can refine the definition of an enthymeme-based
AF.
Definition 17. Given D and E which denote respec-
tively the agent’s deductive arguments and enthymemes, the
agent’s refined enthymeme-based AF is F (D,E) = 〈A,R〉
with
• A = D ∪ E;
• R = RC ∪RQ;
• RC = {(x, y) ∈ A × A | invy(x) ⊆
fix(x) and invx(y) ⊆ fix(y)}: the set of certain attacks;
• RQ ⊆ (A×A)\RC : the set of questionable attacks.
We use RD as a notation for RC ∩ (D×D), which is the set
of attacks between deductive arguments.
Of course, if an argument is a fully specified deductive
argument, then the part of it which is involved in conflicts is
a fixed part. So to refine the AF, we need to check if it is the
case with the enthymemes.
Example 5 Continued. Studying the relations between in-
volved parts and fixed parts for the enthymemes e1 and e2,
we obtain the following:
• invd1(e1) = {β ⇒ γ} 6⊆ fix(e1) = {α, γ};
• invd2(e2) = {¬} 6⊆ fix(e2) = {η,>}.
So none of the attacks (e2, d2) and (d1, e1) is certain.
But we can exhibit more interesting cases, for which the
use of a refined enthymeme-based AF leads to another result
than the basic enthymeme-based AF.
Example 6. Let d3 = 〈{ν, ν ⇒ ¬λ},¬λ〉 be a deductive
argument, and e3 = 〈{κ}, λ〉 an enthymeme, which can be
completed for instance by the additional support Φ′ = {κ⇒
λ}.
It is easy to see here that invd3(e3) = {λ} ⊆ fix(e3) ={κ, λ}, so the conflict between d3 and e3 is not questionable,
and the AF corresponding to these arguments is F6 given in
Fig. 7.
e3 = 〈{κ, κ⇒ λ}, λ〉
d3 = 〈{ν, ν ⇒ ¬λ},¬λ〉
Figure 7: The Refined Enthymeme-based AF F6
When we consider these refined enthymeme-based AFs in
the revision process, the integrity constraint must be adapted
to take into account each certain attack, and not only the ones
between deductive arguments:
Definition 18. Given F (D,E) a refined enthymeme-based
AF, the integrity constraint on certain attacks is
µC = (
∧
(x,y)∈RC
attx,y) ∧ (
∧
(x,y)∈(D×D)\RD
¬attx,y)
This new constraint ensures that a certain attack will not
be removed during the revision process, and that attacks be-
tween deductive arguments will not be added if they do not
belong to the original AF.
Back to Chomsky Example
To conclude, let us formalize the intuitive “Chomsky ex-
ample”, showing the different completions of enthymemes
which lead to the different agents AFs. We use the fol-
lowing propositional variables: retreat means that the US
army will retreat;wkrmeans that the Wikileaks information
about retreat is true; wkf means that the Wikileaks docu-
ments are fake; mnt means that media can not be trusted on
military issues. As they are stated, the arguments a, b and c
which are shared by the agents are these ones:
a = 〈{mnt},>〉, b = 〈{wkf},>〉, c = 〈{wkr},>〉
All of them are enthymemes. For all the agents, the com-
pletion of c is 〈{wkr,wkr ⇒ retreat}, retreat〉. But they
disagree on the completion of the other enthymemes. Agent
A1 considers that a = 〈{mnt,mnt ⇒ ¬wkf,mnt ⇒
¬wkr},¬wkf ∧ ¬wkr〉 and b = 〈{wkf},>〉. Agent A2
completes the enthymemes as follows: a = 〈{mnt,mnt⇒
¬wkf},¬wkf〉 and b = 〈{wkf,wkf ⇒ ¬wkr},¬wkr〉.
Finally, agent A3 uses these completions of enthymemes:
a = 〈{mnt},>〉 and b = 〈{wkf,wkf ⇒ ¬wkr},¬wkr〉.
These completions of enthymemes lead to the AFs
described in Figure 3, with all arguments which are en-
thymemes, and all attacks which are questionable. So here,
in case of a revision, the revision operator is used with the
integrity constraint >, which is equivalent to a revision
without a constraint.
We mentioned in the introduction two scenarios which re-
quire to use dynamics of argumentation techniques. First,
we suppose that agent A2 is considered to be trustworthy by
other agents. Then, when she says that c should be accepted
(which is represented by the formula accc), the other agents
have to revise their AF with this new piece of information.
The result of the revision for A1, with a corresponding com-
pletion of enthymemes which are modified because of the
revision, is given in Figure 8.
a = 〈{mnt,mnt⇒ ¬wkf},¬wkf〉 b c
Figure 8: Revision for Agent A1
Similarly, for A3, Figure 9 describes the possible revised
AFs, with the modified enthymemes corresponding to it.
a b = 〈{wkf},>〉 c
a = 〈{mnt,mnt⇒ ¬wkf},¬wkf〉 b c
Figure 9: Possible Revisions for Agent A3
Finally, the other scenario was a vote on the acceptance
status of c. Since the majority of agents rejects c, A2 has
to revise her AF by ¬accc to find an agreement with the
majority. Possible results are described in Figure 10.
a = 〈{mnt},>〉 b c
a = 〈{mnt,mnt⇒ ¬wkf,mnt⇒ ¬wkr},¬wkf ∧ ¬wkr〉
b c
Figure 10: Possible Revisions for Agent A2
Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that, in realistic situations, agents do
not share all their knowledge and beliefs. There are different
possible reasons, among them, technical and strategical
reasons seem to be the most intuitive explanations. Also,
implicit information is frequently used in natural language
argumentation (on social networks for instance). When
this situation occurs, there is some uncertainty in the
resulting argumentation frameworks built by the agents. It
is likely that agents’ opinion about arguments’ meaning and
relations between arguments will differ; there may be some
misunderstanding in the communication process which
leads to mistakes in the generation of arguments and at-
tacks. Here, this is formalized with the use of enthymemes,
instead of deductive arguments, to represent the uncertain
nature of some arguments. For this reason, the reception
of a new piece of information (supposed to be reliable)
can force the agents to question the current attack relation
to obtain a result which is compatible with the new piece
of information. We have described formally how the use
of enthymemes in the argumentation process can lead to
the existence of these mistaken attacks, and how to define
an argumentation framework which makes the distinction
between the certain attacks and the questionable attacks.
Then, we have seen that the existing works on the dynamics
of abstract AFs can be used to perform a change on an
enthymeme-based AF when it is required to incorporate
a new piece of information. Here, we exemplify it with
the translation-based revision from (Coste-Marquis et al.
2014b), but it can be adapted to any revision, update or
enforcement approach as soon as it is possible to consider
an integrity constraint on the attack relation.
This paper only presents some preliminary work on this
question. Many future works can be envisioned. First, we
want to model the uncertainty by other means than en-
thymemes. For instance, using weights could lead to the
definition of original change operators which define the no-
tion of minimal change w.r.t. these weights; it would then be
more expensive to change a single attack which has a high
weight than to change several attacks with low weights. De-
termining what can be the origin of these weights is partic-
ularly interesting. Combined with the use of enthymemes,
we think that giving a low weight to an attack which is
easy to modify (because there are many possible comple-
tions of enthymemes in the belief base) is an interesting way
to tackle the problem. For the EAFs defined in this paper,
as well as the weighted approach mentioned above, sev-
eral questions are opened. We have made the simplifying
hypothesis that the agents will have some possible comple-
tion of arguments at their disposal, which is not always the
case in real world situations. Similarly, the revision oper-
ators may lead to an empty-set of results (because of the
integrity constraint), or on the opposite, to a non-singleton
set of results. All these cases must be investigated to en-
sure the possibility of some practical applications. The com-
plexity of revising such framework, compared to the orig-
inal revision approach in the abstract setting, will also be
studied to be able to identify which approaches can be used
for real applications. We also plan to use some of the ex-
isting pieces of software for the dynamics of AFs (in par-
ticular the one described in (Coste-Marquis et al. 2015;
Wallner, Niskanen, and Ja¨rvisalo 2015) for extension en-
forcement), to study the scalability of the approaches on
practical examples. But it requires first an important work to
build argumentation graphs from logical knowledge-bases,
since the existing works focus only on argumentation trees
(Efstathiou and Hunter 2008; Efstathiou and Hunter 2011;
Besnard et al. 2010).
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